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WHERE THE NETCOM YARDSTICK COMES UP SHORT:
COURTS SHOULD NOT APPLY THE FACTS OF NETCOM
AS AN EXAMPLE OF INTERMEDIATE AND TRANSIENT
STORAGE UNDER § 512(a) OF THE DMCA
Sean Croman
Abstract: Internet Service Providers (ISPs) risk substantial liability for passively
contributing to subscriber-initiated acts of online copyright infringement. Cognizant of this
problem, courts and Congress have taken differing approaches to limiting ISP liability. The
Netcom court established that ISPs could store infringing material for eleven days without
incurring liability for direct infringement, but did not similarly rule out liability for other
forms of infringement. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) subsequently
advanced the law of copyright by strengthening the protections enjoyed by copyright holders
whose works face exploitation online, subject to four activity-specific "safe harbor"
limitations on liability. For example, § 512(a) of the DMCA offers safe harbor for ISPs that
store "intermediate and transient" copies of infringing material "in the course of" digital
transmissions. In contrast, § 512(c) offers safe harbor for ISPs that store infringing material
at the direction of users, subject to a strict notice-and-takedown requirement. In applying
§ 512(a), some courts consider the terms "intermediate" and "transient" to be facially
ambiguous and look to the DMCA's legislative history for interpretive guidance. Relying
heavily on a legislative committee report discussing a rejected version of the statute, courts in
the Ninth Circuit have concluded that § 512(a) codifies the result of Netcom. Based on this
conclusion, these courts endorse reliance on Netcom's facts as an example of § 512(a)
activity. This Comment argues that courts should not consider or apply Netcom's facts as an
example of intermediate and transient storage under § 512(a) for three reasons. First, the
eleven-day storage of infringing material at issue in Netcom would not constitute
intermediate and transient storage as subsequently defined by § 512(a). Second, courts that
apply Netcom's facts as an example of intermediate and transient storage under § 512(a)
obviate § 512(c)'s notice-and-takedown requirement. Third, the DMCA's text and legislative
history confirm that Congress decided against codifying Netcom in favor of safe harbors that
differ considerably from Netcom's holding. As a result, courts and prospective litigants must
either wait for a predictable definition of intermediate and transient storage to develop
through judicial interpretation of § 512(a)'s express terms or lobby Congress for a more
definitive codified standard. ISP defendants might also seek timely relief under § 512(c) or
assert common law defenses not codified within the DMCA's four comers.
The digital environment poses a significant threat to the interests of
copyright holders.1 The Usenet, a worldwide community of electronic
Bulletin Board Services (BBSs), 2 is no exception.3 Millions of people
1. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 25 (1998).
2. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1365 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
3. See Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1053-54 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (outlining manner
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read and contribute Usenet postings on a daily basis. 4 Postings
frequently contain infringing material supplied by Usenet subscribers.5
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in turn supply the infrastructure
necessary for many subscribers to efficiently communicate, store, and
access infringing content.6 Although ISPs perform a fundamentally
passive role, they nevertheless contribute to the unlawful conduct of
others by serving as a critical link in the widespread distribution of
Usenet postings.7 Not surprisingly, ISPs risk liability for their
contributory role in acts of online infringement.8
Cognizant of the problems faced by ISPs, courts and Congress have
taken differing approaches to limiting ISP liability for online copyright
infringement. In Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Services, Inc.,9 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California held that an ISP could store infringing
material for eleven days without liability for direct infringement.' The
court considered theories of liability discretely and did not similarly rule
against other forms of infringement. 1 Congress subsequently codified
four activity-specific limitations on liability under § 512 of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 1 2 Unlike the disparate limitations
on liability articulated in Netcom,13 DMCA safe harbors shield ISPs
in which infringing Usenet postings are widely distributed online) [hereinafter Ellison ].
4. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1365 n.4 (internal citations omitted).
5. See, e.g., Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that Usenet
discussion group was "used primarily to exchange unauthorized digital copies" of copyrighted
works) [hereinafter Ellison If].
6. See JAY DRATLER, JR., CYBERLAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM
§ 6.01[2], at 6-3 (2004).
7. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369-70 (recognizing that ISPs perform functions that are
"essential if Usenet messages are to be widely distributed").
8. See, e.g., Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373 (recognizing that ISPs can be held liable for materially
contributing to infringing conduct of third parties); Ellison I, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1057 (agreeing with
Netcom court's analysis of ISP liability).
9. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
10. See id. at 1373 ("Because the court cannot see any meaningful distinction (without regard to
knowledge) between what Netcom did and what every other Usenet server does, the court finds that
Netcom cannot be held liable for direct infringement.").
11. See id. at 1372-75, 1377 (ruling against direct and vicarious infringement on different
grounds while holding that ISP defendant could be held liable for contributory infringement for
independent reasons).
12. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.
(2000)). DMCA limitations on liability, commonly referred to as "safe harbors," are codified at 17
U.S.C. § 512.
13. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1366-77 (considering theories of liability and related defenses
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from all forms of infringement 14 under specific statutorily-defined
circumstances. 15 For example, § 512(a) provides a safe harbor for ISPs
that create "intermediate and transient" copies of infringing material "in
the course of' digital transmissions. 16 To qualify for safe harbor under
§ 512(a), ISPs may not allow anyone other than "anticipated recipients"
of user-directed transmissions to access infringing material and must
store infringing material for "reasonably necessary" periods of time.'
7
Section 512(c), by contrast, provides a safe harbor for ISPs that store
content at the direction of users for longer durations. 18 However, to
qualify under § 512(c), ISPs must comply with a strict notice-and-
takedown requirement,' 9 which § 512(a) lacks.20
While Congress enacted the DMCA to clarify the rules of liability for
21
online infringement, courts disagree on whether temporary Usenet
storage constitutes § 512(a) activity and the extent to which Netcom
remains a relevant authority after the enactment of the DMCA.22 Courts
in the Ninth Circuit have concluded that § 512(a) codifies the result of
Netcom based on favorable references to Netcom in a legislative report
describing a proposed limitation on liability that Congress rejected in
favor of appreciably different safe harbors.23 Despite openly recognizing
the problematic nature of outdated legislative records, these courts have
applied Netcom's facts as an example of intermediate and transient
storage under § 512(a).24 In contrast, courts in the Fourth Circuit have
concluded that past common law standards should not influence DMCA
discretely).
14. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 50 (1998) ("The limitations in subsections (a) through
(d) protect qualifying service providers from liability for all monetary relief for direct, vicarious and
contributory infringement.").
15. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d).
16. See id. § 512(a).
17. See id. § 512(a)(4).
18. See id. § 512(c) (affording safe harbor without imposing "in course" storage or "reasonably
necessary" period of time requirement).
19. See id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
20. Seeid. § 512(a).
21. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23-25 (1998) (recognizing need to "more precisely
define the relationship between intellectual property and electronic commerce").
22. See infra Part II.
23. See Ellison II, 357 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004); Ellison 1, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1068-70
(C.D. Cal. 2002).
24. See Ellison II, 357 F.3d at 1081; Ellison I, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1068-70.
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outcomes. 25 These courts have evaluated similar durations of temporary
Usenet storage under § 512(c) rather than § 512(a).26
This Comment argues that courts should not consider or apply
Netcom's facts as an example of intermediate and transient storage under
§ 512(a) for three reasons. First, the eleven-day storage of infringing
material at issue in Netcom would not constitute "intermediate and
transient" storage as subsequently defined under § 512(a).27 Netcom did
not exclusively store infringing material "in the course of' digital
transmissions,28 did not restrict access to "anticipated recipients" of user-
directed transmissions, 29 and did not maintain infringing postings for a
"reasonably necessary" period of time as required under the statute.3 °
Second, courts that apply Netcom's facts as an example of intermediate
and transient storage under § 512(a) contravene § 512(c)'s notice-and-
takedown provision.31 Third, the DMCA's text and legislative history
confirm that Congress decided against codifying common law
standards32 in favor of limitations on liability that differ substantially
from the Netcom court's treatment of ISP liability.3
Part I of this Comment reviews the facts and rationale of Netcom and
discusses § 512's provisions in the context of underlying congressional
goals. Part II examines how courts have reached differing conclusions
regarding whether temporary Usenet storage constitutes § 512(a) activity
and the continued relevance of Netcom. Part III explores how the
DMCA's legislative history offers mixed guidance on the significance of
Netcom within the DMCA's four comers. Part IV argues that Netcom's
facts are an improper yardstick for measuring intermediate and transient
storage under § 512(a) for three reasons: (1) Netcom's eleven-day
storage of Usenet content did not constitute § 512(a) activity; (2)
25. See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 622 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding
that "ultimate conclusion" on liability is controlled by Title II of DMCA).
26. See infra Part lI.B.
27. See infra Part IV.A.
28. See infra Part IV.A.1.
29. See infra Part IV.A.2.
30. See infra Part IV.A.3.
31. See infra Part IV.B.
32. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19 (1998) ("[Tlhe Committee decided to leave current law in its
evolving state and, instead, to create a series of 'safe harbors,' for certain common activities of
service providers.").
33. Compare Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1366-77 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (considering common law theories of liability and related defenses
discretely), with 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (2000) (codifying DMCA limitations on liability).
420
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applying Netcom's facts as a § 512(a) yardstick obviates § 512(c)'s
notice and takedown provision; and (3) Congress expressly considered
and rejected the option of codifying Netcom. This Comment concludes
that courts and prospective litigants must either wait for predictable
standards of intermediate and transient storage to develop through
judicial interpretation of § 512(a)'s express terms or lobby Congress for
a more definitive standard. ISP-defendants might also seek timely relief
under other DMCA safe harbors or assert common law defenses not
codified within the DMCA's four comers.
I. SECTION 512 CODIFIES LIMITATIONS ON ISP LIABILITY
THAT ARE UNLIKE PRIOR COMMON LAW STANDARDS
The DMCA advanced the law of copyright by clarifying the rules of
liability for online infringement.34 Theories of infringement and related
limitations developed incrementally at common law.35 For example, the
Netcom court established that ISPs could temporarily store infringing
material without liability for direct infringement, but did not similarly
rule on other theories of liability.36 Congress subsequently advanced the
law of copyright by codifying four activity-specific "safe harbor"
limitations on ISP liability.37 While the Netcom court addressed theories
of infringement and related defenses discretely, 38 DMCA safe harbors
conditionally shield qualifying ISPs from all forms of infringement.
39
Section 512(a) provides a safe harbor for ISPs that store "intermediate
and transient" copies of infringing material "in the course of' digital
transmissions.4° In contrast, § 512(c) provides a safe harbor for ISPs that
store content for longer periods of time at the direction of users.4' To
34. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-55 1, pt. 2, at 23-25 (1998).
35. See DRATLER, JR., supra note 6, § 1.01, at 1-4.
36. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372-75, 1377 (ruling against direct and vicarious infringement
on different grounds while holding that ISP could be held liable for contributory infringement for
independent reasons).
37. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d); § 512(n) (confirming that each DMCA safe harbor contemplates
a "separate and distinct" ISP function); see also H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23-25, 50
(recognizing need to "more precisely define the relationship between intellectual property and
electronic commerce," and confirming that "[t]he limitations in subsections (a) through (d) protect
qualifying service providers from liability for all monetary relief for direct, vicarious and
contributory infringement").
38. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372-75, 1377.
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d); H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 50.
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
41. See id. § 512(c).
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qualify for safe harbor under § 512(c), ISPs must promptly take down
infringing material upon receiving notice of infringing activity.42
Because DMCA limitations on liability are not exclusive,43 ISP
defendants that fail to qualify for DMCA safe harbors remain free to
assert other common law defenses.
44
A. The Netcom Court Recognized that ISPs May Temporarily Store
Infringing Usenet Content Without Incurring Liability for Direct
Infringement
In Netcom, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California considered, as a matter of first impression, whether courts
should hold ISPs liable for passively facilitating acts of online
infringement.45 Plaintiff Religious Technology Center (RTC) held
copyrights in the works of L. Ron Hubbard, the late founder of the
Church of Scientology.46 Defendant Dennis Erlich allegedly infringed
RTC's copyrights when he posted Hubbard's works on the Usenet
discussion group alt.religion.scientology.47 Erlich gained access to the
Internet through co-defendant Thomas Klemesrud's BBS. 48 Klemesrud's
BBS in turn obtained its Internet connection through co-defendant
Netcom, which at the time was one of the largest providers of Internet
access in the United States.49
The Usenet, or "User Network," is an international collection of
BBSs,50 also known as Usenet "peers, 51 whose computers connect with
one another to exchange information online. Usenet customers read
and contribute to particular Usenet sites.53 Usenet sites in turn distribute
customer postings among other Usenet servers according to explicit and
42. See id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
43. Seeid. § 512(1).
44. See id.
45. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1365 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1365-66.
48. Id. at 1366.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 1365 n.4.
51. See Ellison 1, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
52. See id.
53. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1365 n.4 (citations omitted).
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implicit configuration settings. 4 Usenet traffic flows over a wide range
of digital networks, including the Internet,55 and reaches millions of
people on a daily basis.5 6 ISPs play a significant role in the file sharing
process by: (1) helping make it possible for information posted online to
reach all Usenet servers worldwide in a matter of hours;57 and (2)
retaining copies of Usenet postings for continued access by customers
and other Usenet peers. 58 For example, Netcom's entire customer base
and other Usenet peers could access Erlich's infringing postings while
they resided on Netcom's system.
59
The litigants in Netcom did not dispute the processes by which
Erlich's postings were distributed online.60 Not long after Erlich posted
the infringing material, Klemesrud's BBS server copied the material to
Netcom's Usenet server. 61 Netcom's Usenet server then made the
infringing material available to other Usenet servers, which in turn did
the same for numerous other servers, until all Usenet sites worldwide
had access to the material.62 The entire process took a matter of hours.63
Pursuant to an internal policy, Netcom retained copies of Erlich's
postings for eleven days, during which time Netcom's customers and
other Usenet peers could obtain copies of the infringing material directly
from Netcom's system.64 Although RTC informed Netcom when it
learned of the infringing activity, Netcom took no action to remove or
limit access to the infringing material.65
On cross-motions for summary judgment, RTC claimed that Netcom
had directly, vicariously, and contributorily infringed its copyright




57. See id. at 1367-68.
58. See id. (recognizing that so long as infringing material was stored on Netcom's system,
Netcom's customers and other Usenet sites could download infringing material).
59. See id.
60. See id. at 1367.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 1368.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 1367-68.
65. See id. at 1368.
66. See id. at 1367 ("Plaintiffs argue that, although Netcom was not itself the source of any of the
infringing materials on its system, it nonetheless should be liable for infringement, either directly,
contributorily, or vicariously.").
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unauthorized exercise of one or more of the exclusive rights of copyright
holders as defined under the Copyright Act.67 Liability for direct
infringement typically results from affirmative actions that directly
violate a copyright holder's exclusive rights. 68 Liability for vicarious
infringement requires proof that an infringing party had the right and
ability to control activities in which that party had a direct financial
interest.69 Liability for contributory infringement arises where one party
knowingly induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing
conduct of another.70
The Netcom court addressed theories of liability and related defenses
discretely. The court refused to impose liability for direct infringement
after concluding that Netcom did not commit a volitional act in passively
distributing infringing material.7 ' Consistent with this view, the court
suggested that ISPs should generally be able to retain infringing material
at the direction of subscribers for reasonably limited periods of time
without giving rise to liability for direct infringement.72 In contrast, the
court refused to impose liability for vicarious infringement because RTC
67. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). In describing the exclusive rights of copyright
holders, the Act states:
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive
rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in
copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3)
to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical,
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic,
and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including
the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly; and (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
Id.
68. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368-72.
69. See id. at 1382.
70. See, e.g., Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971) (describing how "one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory'
infringer") (footnote omitted).
71. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368-72 (recognizing in relevant part that "[a]lthough copyright
is a strict liability statute, there should still be some element of volition or causation which is
lacking where a defendant's system is merely used to create a copy by a third party," and "the mere
fact that Netcom's system incidentally makes temporary copies of plaintiffs' works does not mean
Netcom has caused the copying").
72. See id. at 1368-72 (stating general unwillingness to hold ISPs directly liable for copies of
infringing material made and stored on ISP's system where infringing subscriber is clearly directly
liable for same act).
DMCA Limitations on Liability
failed to produce evidence that Netcom received a direct financial
benefit from Erlich's postings.73
The Netcom court did not discuss similar limitations on liability in the
context of contributory infringement.74 Instead, the court explicitly
recognized that courts may hold ISPs contributorily liable for storing
infringing material at the direction of users and then failing to take
"simple" measures to prevent damage to copyright interests after
receiving notice of the infringing activity.75 Summary judgment on
contributory infringement was ultimately precluded by questions of fact
regarding whether Netcom knew, or should have known, that it
substantially contributed to Erlich's actions and whether Netcom could,
upon receiving notice, have limited RTC's injury.76
In short, the Netcom court advanced but did not conclusively define
the contours of ISP liability at common law. The court's decision
established that: (1) ISPs could temporarily store infringing Usenet
content for eleven days without incurring liability for direct
infringement; (2) courts should not hold ISPs liable for vicarious
infringement unless the ISP derived a direct financial benefit from the
infringing activity; and (3) temporary storage of infringing material
could give rise to liability for contributory infringement where an ISP
fails to reasonably limit damage to copyright interests after receiving
notice of infringing activity. Continued uncertainty over the landscape of
liability prompted Congress to enact the DMCA.77
B. The DMCA Promotes E-Commerce by Strengthening Copyright
Protections Subject to Four Activity-Specific Limitations on ISP
Liability
Congress enacted the DMCA to promote e-commerce by enhancing
the protection of copyright interests and clarifying the rules of liability
for online infringement.78 The DMCA's legislative history confirms that
73. Id. at 1377.
74. See id. at 1373-75 (discussing risk of liability for contributory infringement without reference
to limitations on liability discussed in context of direct and vicarious infringement).
75. Id. at 1375.
76. See id. at 1374-75.
77. See H.R. REp. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23 (1998) ("The Committee on Commerce believes it is
important to more precisely define the relationship between intellectual property and electronic
commerce .... ); see also DRATLER, JR., supra note 6, § 1.01, at 1-4 (discussing concerns that
prompted Congress to enact DMCA).
78. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23.
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Congress viewed the promotion of economic growth and the protection
of intellectual property rights as complementary, rather than competing,
goals.79 Legislative action was ultimately prompted by concerns that: (1)
new technologies were creating new threats to copyrighted works at such
a rate that copyright holders could not wait for common law protections
to catch up;80 and (2) unclear common law standards placed ISPs in an
undesirably tenuous position with regard to potential liability.81
The DMCA's most important titles, Titles I and II, focus squarely on
issues related to the Internet.82 Title I strengthens the protections enjoyed
by copyright owners whose works face exploitation online. 83 Title II,
codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512, defines four independent circumstances in
which qualifying ISPs are shielded from liability for direct, vicarious,
and contributory infringement.84 Section 512(a) provides a safe harbor
for ISPs that passively transmit digital content and create "intermediate
and transient" copies of infringing material "in the course of' digital
network communications. 85 Section 512(b) limits ISP liability for
temporarily cached data.8 6 Section 512(c) limits ISP liability for storing
material at the direction of customers, subject to a strict notice-and-
takedown requirement.87 Section 512(d) limits ISP liability for referring
or linking users to infringing material.88 Section 512(n) confirms that
each DMCA safe harbor contemplates a "separate and distinct" activity-
specific limitation on ISP liability.
8 9
79. See id.
80. See DRATLER, JR., supra note 6, § 1.01, at 1-4.
81. See id. § 6.01[2], at 6-19 to 6-20.
82. See id. § 1.02, at 1-5 to 1-6.
83. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12B.01[C][1], at
12B-22 (2004).
84. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d), (n) (2000).
85. See id. § 512(a).
86. See id. § 512(b).
87. See id. § 512(c).
88. Seeid. § 512(d).
89. See id. § 512(n). The Act's legislative history verifies the activity-specific nature of DMCA
safe harbors:
Consider, for example, a service provider that provides a hyperlink to a site containing
infringing material which it then caches on its system in order to facilitate access to it by its
users. This service provider is engaging in at least three functions that may be subject to the
limitation on liability: transitory digital network communications under subsection (a), system
caching under subsection (b), and information location tools under subsection (d).
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 65 (1998).
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C. Section 512(a) Provides a Safe Harbor for ISPs that Store
Infringing Material in the Course of Digital Transmissions
Section 512(a) limits the liability of ISPs that store "intermediate and
transient" copies of infringing material "in the course of' digital
transmissions. 90 As a threshold matter, § 512(a)'s limitations apply
solely to "transitory digital network communications" and related
storage activities. 91 An ISP may seek relief from liability under § 512(a)
only where the ISP: (1) passively transmits material as directed by a
third party through the ISP's system; and (2) stores "intermediate and
transient" copies of infringing material "in the course of' digital network
communications.92 Intermediate and transient copies subsist exclusively
while material is en route to intended destinations, and not under any
other circumstances.93 Consequently, ISPs that store content at points
where transmissions are initiated or received for any length of time
cannot qualify for safe harbor under § 512(a) as a threshold matter.94 For
example, ISPs that provide temporary storage space for online chatroom
content, which may not reside on an ISP's system for longer than
chatroom messages appear onscreen, 95 must seek relief from liability
under § 5 12(c) rather than § 5 12(a).96
After meeting the aforementioned threshold criterion, transmission
and storage activities must conform to five additional requirements in
order for an ISP to qualify for safe harbor under § 512(a).97 First, a
person other than the ISP must initiate or direct the transmission of
infringing material.98 Second, the ISP must carry out the transmission,
routing, and "in course" storage of infringing material through an
automatic technical process. 99 Third, the ISP may not select recipients of
infringing material except as an automatic response to the request of
90. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 51.
94. See id. at 50-51 (recognizing that "intermediate and transient" copies as contemplated under
§ 512(a) are created as automatic consequence of transmission process).
95. See United States v. Johnson, No. 97-CR-0206, 98-CR-160, 2005 WL 22680, at *9 n.9
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2005) (describing fleeting nature ofchatroom content).
96. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 53.
97. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(1)-(5).
98. Id. § 512(a)(1).
99. Id. § 512(a)(2).
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another person. 100 Fourth, the ISP may not maintain copies of infringing
material in a manner: (1) "ordinarily accessible" to anyone other than
"anticipated recipients"; or (2) for longer than is "reasonably necessary"
for the transmission, routing, or provision of connections. 10' Fifth, the
ISP may not modify infringing material.
10 2
The DMCA's legislative history confirms the narrowing influence of
subsections (a)(1) through (5).103 For example, a committee report that
tracks the express language of each enacted provision specifies that ISPs
must serve as passive "conduits" for the communications of others in
order to qualify for safe harbor under § 512(a).10 4 To this end, subsection
(a)(4)'s "reasonably necessary" requirement ensures that eligible copies
of infringing material are made exclusively while infringing material is
en route to its intended destination. 10 5 In similar fashion, subsection
(a)(4)'s "anticipated recipient" requirement prevents ISPs from
qualifying for safe harbor under § 512(a) if they make stored content
available to unintended third parties.
106
D. Section 512(c) Provides a Safe Harbor for ISPs that Store Copies
of Infringing Material at the Direction of Customers, Subject to a
Strict Notice-and-Takedown Provision
Section 512(c) limits the liability of ISPs that store copies of
infringing material on their systems or networks at the direction of
users. 10 7 As a threshold matter, § 512(c) defines qualifying storage as
"storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or
network controlled or operated by or for the service provider."'0 8 ISPs
need not store infringing material "in the course of' digital transmissions
or retain infringing material for a "reasonably necessary" period of time
to limit their liability under § 512(c). 10 9 Section 512(c) therefore
100. Id. § 512(a)(3).
101. Id. § 512(a)(4).
102. Id. § 512(a)(5).




107. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
108. Id. § 512(c)(1).
109. See id. § 512(c) (lacking "in course" and "reasonably necessary" storage requirements).
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contemplates longer periods of storage than § 512(a). °10 That said,
§ 512(c) imposes a number of activity-specific constraints on safe harbor
qualification."' For example, an ISP may not possess knowledge of
infringing material stored on its system," 2 nor may it obtain direct
financial benefits from infringing activity and still qualify for safe harbor
under § 512(c). 13 Additionally, an ISP must, upon receiving notification
of claimed infringement, "respond expeditiously" to remove or disable
access to related infringing material stored on its system."
14
E. The DMCA Operates Independently from Preexisting Common
Law Rights, Remedies, and Defenses
The DMCA does not abolish common law rights, remedies, or
defenses. 1" 5 Section 512's provisions operate as independent statutory
defenses to liability, and therefore apply only after circumstances
demonstrate that an ISP is otherwise subject to liability under existing
principles of law. 16 To this end, § 1330 explicitly provides that the
DMCA does not annul or limit common law rights or remedies
otherwise available to potential litigants. 17 Section 512(1) guarantees
ISP defendants similar rights, providing that an ISP's failure to qualify
for DMCA limitations on liability "shall not bear adversely" on the
consideration of other common law defenses.' 
18
In sum, the Netcom court recognized that ISPs may temporarily store
infringing material without liability for direct infringement, but did not
conclusively define the contours of ISP liability or related defenses.
Congress subsequently codified four activity-specific limitations on ISP
liability applicable to all forms of copyright infringement under § 512 of
the DMCA. Section 512(a) specifically limits the liability of ISPs that
create "intermediate and transient" copies of infringing material in the
course of transitory digital communications. To qualify for safe harbor
under § 512(a), an ISP must: (1) create copies of infringing material "in
110. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
111. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
112. See id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
113. See id. § 512(c)(1)(B).
114. See id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
115. See id. § 1330.
116. See H.R. REP. No. 105-55 1, pt. 2, at 50 (1998).
117. See 17 U.S.C. § 1330.
118. Id. § 512(1).
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the course of' digital network communications; 1'9 (2) not make
infringing material available to anyone other than "anticipated
recipients"; 120 and (3) not store infringing material for longer than
"reasonably necessary" for the transmission, routing, or provision of
connections.1 2' Section 512(c), by contrast, allows ISPs to retain
infringing material for longer periods of time, subject to a strict notice-
and-takedown requirement.12
2
II. COURTS DISAGREE ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH
TEMPORARY STORAGE CONSTITUTES § 512(a) ACTIVITY
AND THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF NETCOM
Federal courts have reached differing results when applying § 512 in
the context of temporary Usenet storage. Courts in the Ninth Circuit
have concluded that § 512(a) codifies the result of Netcom and endorse
reliance on Netcom's eleven-day storage of infringing Usenet content as
an example of "intermediate and transient" storage under § 512(a).123 In
contrast, courts in the Fourth Circuit have concluded that § 512's
statutory provisions operate independently of Netcom 124 and assess
similar durations of storage under § 512(c).125
A. Courts in the Ninth Circuit Have Relied on the Facts ofNetcom as
an Example of§ 512(a) Activity
Although case law applying § 512(a) is limited, courts in the Ninth
Circuit endorse reliance on the facts of Netcom as an example of
intermediate and transient storage under § 512(a). 26 In Ellison v.
Robertson,127 the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
119. See id. § 512(a).
120. See id. § 512(a)(2)-(4).
121. See id. § 512(a)(4).
122. See id. § 512(c).
123. See infra Part II.A.
124. See, e.g., CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 555 (4th Cir. 2004) ("The
DMCA has merely added a second step to assessing infringement liability for Internet service
providers, after it is determined whether they are infringers in the first place under the preexisting
Copyright Act.").
125. See infra Part II.B.
126. See Ellison II, 357 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004); Ellison 1, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1070
(C.D. Cal. 2002).
127. 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
430
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California held that defendant America Online (AOL) could store
infringing Usenet content for fourteen days and still qualify for safe
harbor under § 512(a). 128 Plaintiff Harlan Ellison owned copyrights to a
number of works of science fiction.1 29 Co-defendant Stephen Robertson
posted Ellison's works to a Usenet newsgroup, which in turn transmitted
Robertson's posting to AOL's system. 13 Pursuant to an AOL policy,
AOL stored copies of the unlawful postings on its system for fourteen
days, 131 during which time AOL's thirty million customers 132 and other
Usenet peers worldwide could access the infringing material. 133 AOL
moved for summary judgment' 34 and asserted numerous defenses to
Ellison's claims, including that AOL qualified for safe harbor under
§ 512 subsections (a) and (c). 135
In deciding whether AOL's storage of infringing material constituted
"intermediate and transient" storage as contemplated under § 512(a), the
Ellison court relied heavily on references to Netcom contained in a
legislative committee report discussing a version of § 512(a) that
Congress considered and rejected. 136 The court first deemed the terms
"intermediate" and "transient" to be "rather ambiguous."' 137 The court
then looked to the aforementioned committee report for guidance. 138 The
report indicated in relevant part that the "reasonably necessary"
requirement associated with the rejected version of § 512(a) was "drawn
from the facts of the Netcom case" and intended to codify Netcom's
"implicit" limitation on liability for temporary storage. 
139
The court ultimately concluded that Congress intended to codify
Netcom's facts as a limitation on liability for all forms of infringement
based on similarities between a single subsection of the rejected proposal
128. Id. at 1070.
129. Id. at 1053.
130. Id. at 1053-54.
131. Id. at 1054.
132. See America Online, Who We Are, at http://www.corp.aol.com/whoweare (last visited Mar.
19, 2005) ("Today, about 30 million people around the world count themselves as AOL
members.").
133. See Ellison 1, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1053-54.
134. Id. at 1055.
135. Id. at 1067.
136. See id. at 1069-70.
137. Id. at 1068.
138. See id. at 1068-70.
139. Id. at 1069-70.
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and a related subsection of the enacted law. 140 Despite these similarities,
the court recognized two distinct problems with its approach. 14' First,
the outdated legislative report contemplated a version of § 512 that
differed "in a number of ways" from the subsequently enacted statute. 142
Second, even if certain terms associated with the rejected proposal
appear in the law enacted, the meaning of those terms might be quite
different in the context of a law that contained "vastly more provisions"
than the earlier version. 143
Nevertheless, the court applied Netcom's facts as an example of
intermediate and transient storage under § 512(a). 144 In doing so, the
court reasoned that if eleven days constituted a reasonably limited period
of time in Netcom, then AOL's fourteen-day retention of infringing
Usenet content met § 512(a)'s purportedly Netcom-derived standard. 145
The court discounted the three-day difference between AOL's fourteen-
day storage of infringing material and the eleven-day storage at issue in
Netcom as "insufficient to distinguish the two cases.' ' 146 However, the
court never discussed whether AOL limited distribution of the infringing
material to "anticipated recipients"'147 as expressly required by
§ 512(a)(4). 48 Moreover, the court never addressed whether § 512(c)
applied to the undisputed facts. 149
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed
with the district court's construction of § 512(a), holding that if AOL
met certain general threshold requirements for asserting safe harbor
protection, then AOL would qualify for § 512(a)'s limitation on liability
as a matter of law. 150 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the court below
properly applied Netcom's facts as an example of intermediate and
140. See id. at 1070 n.20.
141. See id. at 1069-70.
142. Id. at 1069.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 1070.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 1067-72 (discussing § 512 limitations on liability without reference to the
requirements of § 512(a)(4)).
148. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(4) (2000).
149. See Ellison I, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1067-72 (discussing § 512 limitations on liability without
addressing whether § 512(c) afforded a relevant safe harbor).
150. See Ellison 11, 357 F.3d 1072, 1074, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004).
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transient storage under § 512(a).15' Like the court below, the Ninth
Circuit never discussed whether AOL made infringing content available
to unanticipated recipients,' and it also never addressed whether
§ 512(c) applied to temporary Usenet storage.
B. Courts in the Fourth Circuit Do Not Consider Netcom's Facts
Relevant to DMCA Defenses and Find that Temporary Usenet
Storage Constitutes § 512(c) Activity
Courts in the Fourth Circuit have concluded that § 512(c) governs
limitations on liability for temporary Usenet storage and do not consider
or apply Netcom's facts when deciding the merits of related defenses.
153
In ALS Scan, Inc., v. RemarQ Communities, Inc.,154 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recognized that § 512(c) conditionally
limits ISP liability for temporary storage activities. 155 Plaintiff ALS Scan
claimed that defendant ISP RemarQ had infringed its copyright interests
by storing infringing material for at least eight days on newsgroups that
RemarQ hosted. 156 RemarQ did not monitor, regulate, or censor the
newsgroup content posted by subscribing members. 157 The district court
relied on Netcom in concluding that RemarQ could not be held directly
liable for passive acts.
158
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit concluded that § 512(c), rather than the
principles articulated by the Netcom court, afforded RemarQ's only
defense. 159 The court explained that, while it found the Netcom court's
151. See id. at 1081.
152. See id. at 1080-82.
153. See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc., v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 622-26 (4th Cir. 2001)
(finding that "ultimate conclusion" on liability for temporary Usenet storage is controlled by Title II
of DMCA and recognizing that § 512(c) "gives Internet service providers a safe harbor from
liability for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material
that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider").
154. 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001).
155. See id. at 623-26. When discussing the relevance of DMCA safe harbors, the RemarQ court
concluded as follows:
The liability-limiting provision applicable here, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), gives Internet service
providers a safe harbor from liability for "infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at
the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by
or for the service provider .. "
Id. at 623 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)).
156. Seeid. at 620-21.
157. Id. at 620.
158. See id. at 621-22.
159. See id. at 622-23.
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reasoning persuasive, the DMCA's express terms controlled the
"ultimate conclusion" on ISP liability.' 60 In the Fourth Circuit's view,
Netcom remained relevant only to the limited extent that § 512's actual
provisions specifically reflected the Netcom court's approach to limiting
ISP liability. 16 1 In ruling on RemarQ's eligibility for safe harbor, the
court held: (1) that the court below failed to adequately consider
RemarQ's claims under § 512(c); 162 and (2) that RemarQ was not
entitled to the DMCA safe harbor because ALS Scan had "substantially
complied" with § 512(c)'s notice requirement, while RemarQ had not
met its corresponding obligations. 63
The Fourth Circuit subsequently clarified its position on the continued
relevance of Netcom in CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc.,' 64 where the
court held that Netcom remains influential as common law precedent,
but only outside the DMCA's four corners. 165 Like RemarQ, defendant
ISP LoopNet passively hosted infringing material. 166 LoopNet customers
were responsible for posting the infringing material, which LoopNet
removed after receiving notice of the unlawful activity from plaintiff
CoStar. 167 The district court below relied on Netcom in granting
LoopNet "conclusive immunity" from direct infringement as a "passive
provider of Internet services."'' 68
On appeal, CoStar argued that Netcom did not survive the DMCA's
enactment. 69 The Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding that while DMCA
safe harbors are distinguishable from common law standards, 70 Netcom
remains influential on the threshold question of whether courts should
hold passive actors strictly liable as direct infringers at common law.'17
160. See id. at 622.
161. See id. ("Although we find the Netcom court reasoning more persuasive, the ultimate
conclusion on this point is controlled by Congress' codification of the Netcom principles in Title 11
of the DMCA.").
162. See id. at 623-26.
163. See id. at 625-26.
164. 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004).
165. See id. at 552 ("[11n enacting the DMCA, Congress did not preempt the decision in Netcom
nor foreclose the continuing development of liability through court decisions interpreting §§ 106
and 501 of the Copyright Act.").
166. See id. at 547.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 548 (internal quotation marks omitted).
169. See id. at 552.
170. See id. at 555.
171. See id.
Vol. 80:417, 2005
DMCA Limitations on Liability
The court recognized that DMCA limitations on liability are not
exclusive and that ISPs accordingly remain "entitled to all other
arguments" under the law, "whether by way of an affirmative defense or
through an argument that conduct simply does not constitute a prima
facie case of infringement under the Copyright Act."172 The court also
noted that while a rejected prior version of § 512 may have closely
tracked the Netcom court's reasoning, the enacted law differs in
significant ways from the purportedly Netcom-derived version.
173
In discounting the relevance of Netcom within the DMCA's four
comers, the Fourth Circuit identified three significant differences
between the rejected proposal and the enacted legislation. 174 First, the
enacted legislation, unlike the rejected proposal, draws no distinction
between direct and indirect liability.175 Second, the rejected proposal did
not afford a distinct safe harbor for ISPs that store infringing material at
the direction of users, as expressly contemplated under § 512(c).
176
Third, the rejected proposal unconditionally shielded ISPs from direct
liability for automatic processes, while the enacted law includes an
entire layer of threshold conditions for safe harbor eligibility related to
passive acts. 177 The court ultimately considered these differences
sufficient to conclude that the Netcom court's approach to ISP liability
did not govern the meaning of § 512's terms. 178 ISPs seeking relief under
§ 512 must therefore fulfill the conditions imposed by the statute once a
prima facie case of infringement has been established.1
79
III. THE DMCA'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PROVIDES MIXED
GUIDANCE ON THE RELEVANCE OF NETCOM
The DMCA's legislative history confirms that § 512's terms changed
significantly during the legislative process. 180 In fact, Congress
172. See id. at 552.
173. See id. at 554-55 (discussing at length substantial differences between proposed limitations





178. See id. (concluding that Congress "intended the DMCA's safe harbor for ISPs to be a floor,
not a ceiling, of protection" and, as such, that DMCA "merely added a second step to assessing
infringement liability" after ISP is found otherwise subject to liability).
179. See id. at 555.
180. Compare H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 7-8 (1998) (describing limitations on liability
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considered and rejected a version of § 512 that, like the standards
articulated in Netcom, would grant ISPs immunity from liability for
direct infringement without foreclosing liability for vicarious or
contributory infringement under similar factual circumstances. 1 81 Not
surprisingly, congressional intent to codify Netcom appears in references
to the rejected prior version of § 512.182 However, legislative reports
associated with the limitations on liability that Congress enacted evince
no congressional intent to codify common law standards. 183 Rather, these
records indicate that Congress decided to codify discrete new limitations
on liability while leaving the common law, including the standards
articulated in Netcom, in an "evolving state."'' 84
A. Legislative History Discussing a Rejected Version of§ 512(a)
Suggests that Congress Previously Considered Codifying the
"Essence" ofNetcom
A committee report associated with a rejected version of § 512
indicates that Congress considered codifying the Netcom court's
approach to limiting ISP liability.'85 One passage provides that § 512
premised on Netcom that Congress considered and rejected), with 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (2000)
(codifying DMCA limitations on liability).
181. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19 (1998) ("[T]he Committee decided to leave current law in its
evolving state and, instead, to create a series of 'safe harbors,' for certain common activities of
service providers."); Eric Evans, Note, From the Cluetrain to the Panopticon: ISP Activity
Characterization and Control ofInternet Communications, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
445, 475 (2004). Compare Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361, 1366-77 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (considering common law theories of liability and
related defenses discretely), and H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 7-8 (describing limitations on
liability premised on Netcom that Congress considered and rejected), with 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d)
(codifying DMCA limitations on liability).
182. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 11, 24-25 (discussing Netcom in reference to proposed
and subsequently rejected legislation).
183. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49-66; S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19-21 (discussing
enacted DMCA limitations on liability without suggesting intent to codify Netcom or other common
law principles).
184. A pertinent committee report states, in relevant part:
There have been several cases relevant to service provider liability for copyright infringement.
Most have approached the issue from the standpoint of contributory and vicarious liability.
Rather than embarking upon a wholesale clarification of these doctrines, the Committee
decided to leave current law in its evolving state and, instead, to create a series of "safe
harbors," for certain common activities of service providers.
S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19.
185. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 11, 24-25 (discussing Netcom in reference to proposed
and subsequently rejected legislation).
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was previously intended to codify the "core of current case law" dealing
with ISP liability and that the rejected legislation, unlike the law
enacted, distinguished "between direct infringement and secondary
liability, treating each separately., 186 Another passage indicates that
§ 512 was intended to codify Netcom in referencing language considered
but not included in the DMCA. 187 A frequently cited passage, which
provides in relevant part that § 512(a) "essentially codifies the result" of
Netcom insofar as Netcom ruled out direct liability for "passive,
automatic acts,' ' 188 appears in a similarly outdated discussion of
proposed limitations on liability that differ in many respects from the
limitations on liability that Congress enacted. 189
At least one commentator reconciles the substantial differences
between § 512's enacted text and prior legislative intent to codify the
essence of Netcom by concluding that § 512 does indeed reflect the
essence of decisions like Netcom: namely, a desire to avoid applying the
usual rules of strict liability to ISPs acting as passive conduits for
infringing material.' 90 In this commentator's view, § 512's complex
terms confirm that, in the final analysis, "Congress neither 'codified' the
Netcom decision nor gave the courts general instructions to satisfy that
desire, however legitimate it may be."' 191 As such, § 512's limitations
stand alone, and the common law applies only when § 512 "in all its
detail and complexity" does not.
192
B. Legislative History Discussing the Version of§ 512 that Congress
Enacted Suggests that Congress Rejected the Option of Codifying
the Netcom Court's Approach to Limiting ISP Liability
Legislative history discussing the enacted version of § 512(a) evinces
a strong congressional desire to leave the common law, including the
principles articulated in Netcom, "in its evolving state" and to codify
186. See id. at 11.
187. See id. at 11, 24-26 (referring to proposed limitations on liability that closely followed
Netcom court's approach to liability as outlined at pp. 7-8 of same legislative committee report); see
also Evans, supra note 181, at 475 ("Congress considered and rejected the option of simply
adopting the Netcom rule shielding ISPs from direct liability for passive or automatic transmission
of messages but leaving open the possibility of contributor or vicarious liability.").
188. H.R. REP.No. 105-551,pt. 1,at 11.
189. See Ellison I, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2002).




discrete statutory limitations on liability. 193 Relevant passages discuss
the types of intermediate and transient storage that constitute § 512(a)
activity in specific terms. 194 One such passage stipulates that § 512(a)
applies only where: (1) transmissions are initiated by or at the direction
of persons other than an ISP; (2) communications are carried out through
an automatic technical process; (3) an ISP does not select the recipients
of infringing material except as an automatic response to the request of
another; (4) no copy of infringing material is maintained on the ISP's
system in a manner ordinarily accessible to unanticipated recipients or
for any longer than reasonably necessary; and (5) the content of
infringing material is not modified by the ISP in the course of
transmission.1 95 Another passage confirms that "intermediate and
transient" copies are copies "made and/or stored in the course of a
transmission," not copies made or stored at points where transmissions
are initiated or received. 196 Unlike the law enacted, the rejected proposal
contained nothing comparable to § 512(a)'s "in course" storage
requirement.' 97 In short, Congress seemingly decided to codify discrete
new limitations on liability while leaving the common law, including the
principles articulated in Netcom, in an "evolving state."' 198
IV. COURTS SHOULD NOT CONSIDER OR APPLY NETCOM' S
FACTS AS AN EXAMPLE OF § 512(a) ACTIVITY
Courts should not consider or apply Netcom's facts as an example of
"intermediate and transient" storage under § 512(a) for three reasons.
First, Netcom's eleven-day storage of infringing material did not
constitute intermediate and transient storage as subsequently defined by
193. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19 (1998).
194. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 50-51 (1998).
195. See id. at 51.
196. See id. at 50-51 (emphasis added).
197. Compare H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 7-8 (describing limitations on liability premised
on Netcom that Congress considered and rejected), with 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2000) (codifying
DMCA limitation on liability for intermediate and transient storage).
198. A pertinent committee report states, in relevant part:
There have been several cases relevant to service provider liability for copyright infringement.
Most have approached the issue from the standpoint of contributory and vicarious liability.
Rather than embarking upon a wholesale clarification of these doctrines, the Committee
decided to leave current law in its evolving state and, instead, to create a series of "safe
harbors," for certain common activities of service providers.
S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19.
438
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§ 512(a). 199 Second, courts that apply Netcom's facts as an example of
§ 512(a) activity obviate § 512(c)'s notice-and-takedown provision.2 °°
Third, the DMCA's text and legislative history confirm that Congress
decided to create new limitations on liability that differ in significant
respects from the Netcom court's treatment of ISP liability,20' while
leaving the common law in an evolving state.2°2 ISPs that fail to qualify
for safe harbor under § 512(a) may still assert other DMCA safe harbors
and common law defenses.20 3
A. Storing Usenet Content for Subscriber Access Does Not Constitute
Intermediate and Transient Storage as Defined Under § 512(a)
Courts should not apply Netcom' s facts as an example of intermediate
and transient storage under § 512(a) because Netcom's eleven-day
storage of infringing material would not constitute § 512(a) activity. In
fact, Netcom would fail to qualify for safe harbor under § 512(a) for
three reasons. First, Netcom did not store infringing material "in the
course of' transmission.204 Rather, Netcom stored infringing material for
longer than necessary to facilitate transmission.20 5 Second, Netcom did
not limit access to "anticipated recipients" of infringing material.20 6
Third, Netcom did not store infringing material for a "reasonably
necessary" period of time.
2 °7
1. Netcom 's Eleven-Day Retention of Infringing Usenet Content
Would Fail § 512(a) 's "in the Course of' Requirement
Netcom's eleven-day storage of infringing material did not take place
"in the course of' transmission as required by § 512(a). Section 512(a)
199. See infra Part IV.A.
200. See infra Part IV.B.
201. Compare Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1366-77 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (considering common law theories of liability and related defenses
discretely), with 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (enacting limitations on liability).
202. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19 (1998) ("[T]he Committee decided to leave current law in its
evolving state and, instead, to create a series of 'safe harbors,' for certain common activities of
service providers.").
203. See 17 U.S.C. § 512.
204. See infra Part IV.A.1.
205. See infra Part IV.A.1.
206. See infra Part IV.A.2.
207. See infra Part IV.A.3.
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applies solely to "intermediate and transient" storage that occurs "in the
course of' transmitting, routing, or providing connections. °8 As a
threshold matter, ISPs that store content at points where transmissions
are initiated or received for any length of time cannot qualify for safe
harbor under § 512(a).20 9 Erlich's infringing posting reached all Usenet
servers worldwide in a matter of hours. 210 Netcom stored the infringing
material for eleven days.21 1 For the bulk of that time, the infringing
material was not en route to a particular destination.1 2 Rather, the
material lingered on Netcom's system where all of Netcom's subscribers
and other Usenet peers could access it.21 3 As a result, the infringing
content was not stored "in the course of' transmitting, routing, or
providing connections as required by § 512(a).2 14
2. Netcom 's Eleven-Day Retention of Infringing Usenet Content
Would Fail § 512(a) 's "Anticipated Recipients " Requirement
Netcom would also fail to qualify for safe harbor under § 512(a)
because Netcom did not limit access to "anticipated recipients" of
infringing material temporarily stored on its system. Section 512(a)
denies safe harbor protection to ISPs that make infringing material
"accessible to anyone other than anticipated recipients. 21 5 After
Ehrlich's local BBS server posted infringing material on Netcom's
Usenet server, Netcom's entire customer base and all other Usenet peers,
whether intended recipients of the posting or not, could access the
infringing material.216 Netcom's eleven-day retention of infringing
material 217 would therefore fail § 512(a)'s "anticipated recipients"
requirement,21 8 unless every member of Netcom's subscriber base, in
addition to all members of the Usenet community worldwide,219 could be
208. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
209. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 50-51 (1998).
210. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1367-68 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
211. Id. at 1367.
212. See id. at 1367-68.
213. See id.
214. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2000).
215. Id. § 512(a)(4).
216. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1367-68.
217. See id. at 1367.
218. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(4).
219. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1367-68.
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reasonably classified as intended recipients of infringing postings. This
interpretation would contravene § 512(a)'s plain meaning by rendering
the "anticipated recipients" requirement meaningless.
3. Netcom's Eleven-Day Retention of Infringing Usenet Content
Would Fail § 512(a) 's "Reasonably Necessary'" Requirement
Section 512(a) also denies safe harbor protection to ISPs that store
copies of infringing material for longer than "reasonably necessary for
the transmission, routing, or provision of connections., 220 Netcom stored
infringing material for eleven days.221 Information posted by a Usenet
subscriber reaches all Usenet servers worldwide in a manner of hours.222
While some period of storage is presumably necessary for the passive
transmission of material between Usenet servers, storing infringing
postings for eleven days cannot be reasonably necessary when
transmission time is measured in hours, not days. 2 3 As such, Netcom
stored infringing material for longer than "reasonably necessary," as
contemplated under § 512(a).
B. Courts that Consider and Apply Netcom's Eleven-Day Storage of
Infringing Usenet Content as a Yardstick Under § 512(a) Obviate
§ 512(c) 's Notice-and-Takedown Provision
Courts that apply Netcom's facts as an example of "intermediate and
transient" storage under § 512(a) 224 contravene § 512(c)'s notice-and-
takedown provision. 225 Congress did not include a notice-and-takedown
requirement under § 512(a),22 6 presumably because ISPs that engage in
properly classified § 512(a) activities do not retain infringing material
long enough to make notice-and-takedown a practical solution.227 If
Netcom's eleven-day storage of infringing content truly constituted
220. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(4).
221. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1367.
222. See id. at 1368.
223. See id. at 1367-68.
224. See Ellison 11, 357 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004); Ellison I, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1070
(C.D. Cal. 2002).
225. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).
226. See id. § 512(a).
227. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 51 (1998) (confirming that intermediate and transient
copies must be "made of material while it is en route to its destination" and not under any other
circumstances) (emphasis added).
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§ 512(a) activity, as suggested by courts in the Ninth Circuit,228 then
every service provider that stores infringing Usenet content for eleven
days, and possibly longer, could ignore § 512(c)'s notice-and-takedown
provision.229 For example, if a copyright holder informed an ISP two
days after a subscriber posted infringing content, the ISP could take no
action for nine additional days without incurring any liability.230 Even
the Netcom court recognized that failure to prevent damage to copyright
interests upon notice of infringing activity could give rise to ISP liability
for contributory infringement.231 Although mindful of ISPs' exposure to
liability, Congress was principally interested in promoting e-commerce
by further safeguarding the rights of copyright holders,232 and therefore
could not have intended a contrary result.
A narrow reading of § 512(a) does not prevent ISPs from asserting
other DMCA safe harbors or common law defenses.233 For example,
ISPs may still argue that their temporary storage activities fall within the
express provisions of § 512(c). 234 The Fourth Circuit looked precisely to
this safe harbor in assessing limitations on liability relevant to an ISP
that stored infringing Usenet content for at least eight days.235 In doing
so, the Fourth Circuit properly recognized that ISPs may store Usenet
content at the direction of subscribers in compliance with § 512(c)'s
strict notice-and-takedown provision without giving rise to liability.236
Consistent with the Fourth Circuit's position on common law rights,
237
228. See Ellison 1, 357 F.3d at 1081; Ellison I, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
229. See Ellison I, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (obviating need for ISP that stored infringing material
for fourteen days to remove or limit access to infringing material by holding that ISP's activity
constituted intermediate and transient storage under § 512(a), which does not contain notice-and-
takedown provision); Ellison H, 357 F.3d at 1081 (agreeing with the Ellison I court's construction
and application of § 512(a)).
230. See Ellison 1, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1070; Ellison 1I, 357 F.3d at 1081.
231. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1373-74 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
232. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23 (recognizing two priorities underlying DMCA:
"promoting the continued growth and development of electronic commerce; and protecting
intellectual property rights").
233. See supra Part I.E.
234. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2000).
235. See ALS Scan, Inc. v RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 620, 622-26 (4th Cir. 2001).
236. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(I)(A)(iii), (c)(1)(C); ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 623 (recognizing
§ 512(c) "gives Internet service providers a safe harbor from liability for infringement of copyright
by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network
controlled or operated by or for the service provider").
237. See CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 552 (4th Cir. 2004) ("We conclude
442
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ISP defendants might also argue that their actions do not constitute a
prima facie case of infringement as a threshold matter before ever
reaching DMCA limitations on liability.
2 38
C. Section 512 's Text and Legislative History Confirm that Congress
Rejected the Netcom Court's Approach to Limiting ISP Liability
Courts that apply Netcom's facts as an example of intermediate and
transient storage under § 512(a)239 erroneously rely on outdated
legislative records and ignore § 512(a)'s express terms. These courts
characterize Netcom's influence on § 512(a) according to a proposed
limitation on liability that maintained Netcom's distinction between
direct, contributory, and vicarious infringement.240 The legislative report
associated with that proposal provides in relevant part that § 512(a)'s
"reasonably necessary" requirement was drawn from the facts of Netcom
and intended to codify Netcom's "implicit" holding by limiting liability
for temporary storage. 24 However, Congress rejected that proposal in
favor of safe harbors that differ in significant respects from the Netcom
court's holding.242 Despite recognizing the problematic nature of their
reliance on outdated legislative records,243 these courts have still
erroneously concluded that § 512(a) codifies Netcom's facts.244
More directly relevant legislative reports confirm that Congress
decided to leave the common law, including the principles articulated in
that in enacting the DMCA, Congress did not preempt the decision in Netcom nor foreclose the
continuing development of liability through court decisions interpreting §§ 106 and 501 of the
Copyright Act.").
238. See id. (recognizing that DMCA limitations on liability are not exclusive and that ISPs
accordingly remain "entitled to all other arguments under the law-whether by way of an
affirmative defense or through an argument that conduct simply does not constitute a prima facie
case of infringement under the Copyright Act").
239. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a); see Ellison 11, 357 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004); Ellison 1, 189 F.
Supp. 2d 1051, 1068-70 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
240. See supra notes 136-51 and accompanying text. Compare Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom
On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1366-77 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (considering
common law theories of liability and related defenses discretely), and H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1,
at 7-8 (1998) (describing limitations on liability premised on Netcom that Congress considered and
rejected), with 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (enacting limitations on liability).
241. See Ellison 1, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1069; H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 24.
242. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19 (1998) ("[T]he Committee decided to leave current law in its
evolving state and, instead, to create a series of 'safe harbors,' for certain common activities of
service providers."); see Ellison 1, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1069.
243. See Ellison 1, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1069.
244. See supra Part II.A.
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Netcom, in an "evolving state," and that § 512 was designed to create
discrete statutory limitations on liability for specific ISP activities.245
Not surprisingly, legislative records associated with § 512's enacted
terms evince no intent to codify the Netcom court's approach to liability
or other common law principles.246 While Congress may have indeed
codified the "essence" of cases like Netcom by limiting ISP liability in
247certain contexts,  Congress expressly considered and rejected the
option of codifying common law standards248 in favor of appreciably
different statutory limitations on liability.
249
In sum, courts should not consider or apply Netcom's facts as an
example of intermediate and transient storage under § 512(a) for three
reasons. First, Netcom's eleven-day storage of infringing Usenet content
would not constitute intermediate and transient storage as subsequently
defined under § 512(a). Second, courts that apply Netcom's facts as an
example of § 512(a) activity obviate § 512(c)'s notice-and-takedown
requirement. Third, Congress openly considered and rejected a proposal
to codify the Netcom court's approach to ISP liability. While Netcom
may remain relevant as common law precedent outside of the DMCA's
four comers, Netcom's facts are an improper yardstick for measuring
intermediate and transient storage under § 512(a).
V. CONCLUSION
The DMCA's text and legislative history preclude reliance on the
facts of Netcom as an example of intermediate and transient storage
under § 512(a). Congress considered and rejected proposed legislation
that would have essentially codified the Netcom court's approach to
limiting ISP liability in favor of appreciably different safe harbors.
Courts that apply Netcom's eleven-day storage of infringing Usenet
content as an example of § 512(a) activity erroneously rely on outdated
245. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19 (1998).
246. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49-66 (1998); S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19-21
(discussing enacted limitations on liability without evincing any congressional intent to codify
Netcom's approach to ISP liability or other common law principles).
247. See DRATLER, JR., supra note 6, § 6.01[3], at 6-40.1.
248. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19.
249. Compare Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1366-77 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (considering common law theories of liability and related defenses
discretely), and H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 7-8 (1998) (describing limitations on liability
premised on Netcom that Congress considered and rejected), with 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (2000)
(enacting limitations on liability under § 512).
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depictions of the rejected legislative proposal in defiance of § 512(a)'s
plain meaning. Consequently, courts and litigants seeking predictable
outcomes under § 512(a) must wait for a consistent standard of
intermediate and transient storage to develop through interpretation of
§ 512(a)'s express terms, or petition Congress for a more definitive
codified standard. ISP defendants might also seek timely relief under
other DMCA safe harbors, such as § 512(c), or resort to common law
defenses not codified within the DMCA's four comers.
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